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The Case for TIPS: 
An Examination of the Costs 
and Benefits 
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
lightly more than a decade has passed since the inaugural
 issuance of inflation-indexed debt by the U.S. Treasury 
Department. Eleven years and thirty issues later, we are at a 
good vantage point from which to evaluate the successes and 
failures of the Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) 
program. 
From a purely financial perspective, a number of recent 
studies have suggested that the program has been a 
disappointment. After calculating the direct costs of TIPS 
issuance relative to issuance of nominal Treasury securities, the 
studies show that the first ten years of the TIPS program have 
cost the Treasury billions of dollars (Sack and Elsasser 2004; 
Roush 2008). 
Importantly, these studies rely entirely on ex post analysis. 
In other words, the studies ask, Given the actual inflation 
outcome, did the costs of TIPS issuances exceed the costs of 
nominal Treasury issuances of similar durations? This 
approach depends on the actual inflation outcome, which may 
differ from expectations at the time the TIPS investment was 
made because investors do not have perfect foresight of 
inflation. If investors underpredict actual inflation when 
purchasing TIPS at auction, then these positive forecast errors 
would increase the payments that the Treasury has to make to 
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• Some studies suggest that the issuance of 
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS)—
inflation-indexed debt—has not been as cost-
effective for the Treasury as the issuance of 
nominal securities.
￿ The studies base their conclusions on ex post 
analysis, that is, they look back from the actual 
inflation outcome to determine whether TIPS 
issuance costs exceeded the costs of nominal 
Treasury issuances of similar durations.
￿ This article argues that the ex post approach 
has drawbacks when it comes to assessing the 
costs and benefits of TIPS over the long run; 
instead, an ex ante approach is recommended.
￿ A comprehensive analysis of TIPS should also 
consider the program’s other, more difficult-
to-quantify, benefits—especially when cost 
analysis shows that TIPS are only marginally 
more expensive or about as expensive as 
nominal issuances. 
￿ The ex ante costs of TIPS issuance are found to 
be about equal to the costs of nominal Treasury 
issuance; moreover, TIPS provide meaningful 
benefits to investors and policymakers.
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TIPS holders to compensate them for realized inflation.1, 2 
Upside inflation surprises tend to increase the ex post cost of 
issuing TIPS compared with nominal Treasuries. 
While inflation forecast errors are relevant for calculating 
the actual costs incurred over the first ten years of the TIPS 
program, we believe they are irrelevant in assessing the 
expected benefits or costs of the program over the long run—a 
theme we explore in this article. In other words, current ex post 
analysis suffers from the problem of small sample size, 
particularly since most of the issues have overlapping lifetimes 
and therefore are not necessarily independent of each other. In 
the long run, investors learn from their mistakes, and inflation 
shocks tend to average out. When investors make a particular 
forecast error, they adapt their future expectations accordingly 
so they do not persistently make the same error. This means 
that eventually, amid shifting economic conditions, their 
accumulated forecast errors will average to zero. Similarly, over 
time, the amount of upside and downside inflation surprises 
should average to zero. The implication of this process for the 
TIPS program is that, in the long run, factors other than 
inflation forecast errors will determine its cost relative to the 
cost of nominal Treasury issuance (Table 1). 
What are these other factors? Two primary factors are the 
compensation investors require to hold a security that is less 
liquid than its nominal counterpart, termed the illiquidity 
premium, and the insurance value they attach to obtaining 
protection against inflation risk, known as the inflation risk 
premium.3 With regard to the first factor, when investors are 
worried about their ability to resell TIPS in a liquid secondary 
market, they require compensation for holding the securities 
compared with more liquid alternatives. This illiquidity 
premium tends to drive up TIPS yields and increase the 
Treasury’s borrowing costs. The second factor works in the 
1 Conversely, negative inflation forecast errors decrease the inflation payments 
by the Treasury relative to the amount it received for providing investors with 
protection against inflation. 
2 As we discuss, there are other factors that also help determine whether an 
issue brings in more revenue than it generates, including illiquidity and 
inflation risk premiums. 
opposite direction. To the extent that investors are willing to 
pay for inflation protection, they would purchase TIPS at a 
price above that implied by their expected payment stream. 
As such, inflation risk premiums result in lower expected 
borrowing costs for the government and savings for the TIPS 
program compared with nominal issuance.
To determine which factor has been historically dominant, 
we conduct an ex ante cost analysis: We compare the amount 
that the Treasury received for inflation compensation at 
auction with an observable measure of contemporaneous 
inflation expectations.4 The difference between these series 
yields a measure of the net savings or loss incurred by the 
Treasury that is independent of inflation forecast errors. It is 
also equal to the net value of the illiquidity and inflation risk 
premiums associated with each TIPS issue. We find that prior 
to 2004, the break-even inflation rate is below a survey measure 
of inflation expectations.5 This indicates that the illiquidity 
premium exceeded the inflation risk premium over this period. 
Since 2004, however, we find that break-even rates were 
approximately equal to expected inflation, indicating that the 
two factors were roughly in balance. 
3 In addition to these primary factors, TIPS yields also reflect the taxation 
difference between TIPS and nominal issuances, the convexity difference 
between real and nominal yields, and the price of the embedded deflation floor. 
Regarding the tax differential, because an investor has to pay taxes currently on 
the accrual of the principal amount payable at maturity on inflation-protected 
issues, non–tax-exempt investors may require a higher yield on TIPS (a lower 
TIPS break-even) than what would be associated with their true inflation 
expectations. As a result, it may be more difficult for the Treasury to capture 
investors’ full inflation expectations and inflation risk premiums. In contrast, 
the attractiveness of TIPS may be enhanced as a result of the fact that, at 
maturity, TIPS holders receive the higher of the inflation-adjusted principal 
amount or the par amount. 
4 The measure of contemporaneous inflation expectations may differ from that 
embedded in TIPS break-evens at TIPS auctions because the subset of investors 
is slightly different. Primary dealers, which have been awarded an average of 
54 percent of the competitive bids accepted at TIPS auctions since mid-2003, 
are not the end-users of TIPS, and likely put in an underwriting bid at auction. 
That said, because the Treasury is paid at the auction stop-out rate, we believe 
this measure is most appropriate for our analysis.
5 The break-even inflation rate is the spread between a TIPS yield and a 
nominal yield with a similar maturity. It is the inflation rate that will equate 
the return on a TIPS with the return on a nominal security.
While inflation forecast errors are relevant 
for calculating the actual costs incurred 
over the first ten years of the TIPS 
program, we believe they are irrelevant in 
assessing the expected benefits or costs 
of the program over the long run.
Table 1
Impact of Changes in Factors on TIPS 
Break-Even Inflation
Factor
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There are two possible reasons for the change in fortune 
for TIPS issued after 2004. Over time, as the TIPS market 
developed, the illiquidity risk premium shrank and/or inflation 
risk premiums increased. Evaluating the two components 
independently, we conclude that a decline in the illiquidity 
premium is the more convincing explanation. In particular, 
our review of the evidence shows a downward secular trend in 
the TIPS illiquidity premium. In contrast, the inflation risk 
premiums appear to have remained relatively low and stable 
in recent years. 
These findings have important implications for assessing 
the benefits and costs of future TIPS issuances. The TIPS 
illiquidity that persisted during the first several years of the 
program and that appears to explain much of the cost of past 
issuances no longer seems to be an important factor.6 As a 
result, as long as the illiquidity premium and inflation 
premiums do not shift in systematic ways, future TIPS 
issuances should be much more cost-effective for the Treasury. 
A second theme of this article is that relative cost 
calculations, on either an ex ante or ex post basis, are just one 
aspect of a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of 
the TIPS program. We believe that TIPS issuance provides the 
taxpayer with other benefits that should be taken into account 
when evaluating the program—especially when cost analysis 
shows that TIPS are either only marginally more expensive or 
about as expensive to issue as nominals. Some of these benefits, 
such as a broadening of the Treasury’s investor base and a 
diversification of its funding sources, were cited by Treasury 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance Timothy S. 
Bitsberger as a way for the Treasury to “reduce our borrowing 
costs over time.”7 As such, some of the difficult-to-measure 
benefits of the TIPS program are consistent with the Treasury’s 
current debt management objectives. In a November 2001 
speech, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance 
Peter Fisher emphasized that “The debt management strategy 
of Treasury has been to strive to be regular and predictable in 
the issuance of debt while minimizing borrowing costs over 
6 Roush (2008) finds that outstanding TIPS issuances under the counterfactual 
assumption that there was no illiquidity premium imply significant cost 
savings. 
7 See Bitsberger (2002).
many years and interest rate cycles.”8 This strategy has meant 
issuing and paying down debt in a manner that promotes 
market liquidity and obtains financing across the yield curve.
To assess the net benefits and costs of the TIPS program 
more fully, we discuss other benefits that we believe are central 
to a complete evaluation of the program. Although these 
benefits are not easily measured, they may be considerable. For 
example, we describe how the program provides important 
advantages for investors with real saving objectives as well as 
valuable information for policymakers whose directive is to 
contain inflation. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The 
next section examines the ex ante costs of TIPS issuance. 
Measures of illiquidity and inflation risk premiums embedded 
in TIPS are reviewed in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss other 
economic benefits of inflation-indexed debt that are not 
captured in relative cost measures. Section 5 summarizes our 
main conclusions.
2. Ex Ante Cost Analysis
Studies that have evaluated the issuance costs of TIPS 
compared with nominal Treasuries have typically compared 
ex post costs. These studies usually show that TIPS issuance has 
resulted in a higher net cost to the Treasury. For example, 
Sack and Elsasser (2004) find a net cost to the Treasury from 
the start of the program through early 2004 of slightly less 
than $3 billion. Roush (2008) finds that total ex post costs of 
TIPS through March 2007 were in the range of $5 billion to 
$8 billion.9 
A problem with current ex post analysis, however, is that it 
depends upon the performance of inflation over a relatively 
short period of time. If inflation proves to be meaningfully 
different than what was expected at the time of TIPS issuance, 
then this difference—the “inflation surprise”—affects the costs 
of TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries. For instance, if inflation 
turns out to be higher than expected, then TIPS issuance 
becomes more expensive relative to nominal Treasury 
issuance. If inflation turns out to be lower, however, an ex post 
analysis would show higher savings (lower costs) from the TIPS 
program. 
The importance of the inflation surprise in determining 
ex post costs can be seen in other developed countries with 
8 See Fisher (2001). See Gensler (1998) and Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) 
for an overview of Treasury debt management. 
9 To put the range in perspective, we note that the average annual increase in 
publicly held outstanding Treasury marketable debt since 2002 is approxi-
mately $227 billion. Furthermore, $5 billion to $8 billion represents 
0.1 to 0.2 percent of total outstanding Treasury marketable debt held by 
the public as of June 2008.
As long as the illiquidity premium and 
inflation premiums do not shift in 
systematic ways, future TIPS issuances 
should be much more cost-effective 
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similar programs of inflation-linked sovereign debt issuance. 
In fact, several other developed countries’ inflation surprises 
have resulted in lower costs of inflation-linked debt issuance 
compared with the costs of nominal debt issuance. For 
example, in its 2000-01 Annual Review, the United Kingdom 
Debt Management Office notes that the “significant reduction 
in the cost of funding [from the inflation-linked debt program] 
… has partly been due to the reduction of inflation risk but 
more importantly because of the fact market expectations of 
inflation have exceeded the inflation outturn (‘outcome’) for 
much of the last twenty years.”10 Similarly, a 2006 ex post cost 
study by the Agency France Trésor finds that its inflation-
linked debt program saved the government ¤120 million 
between 1998 and 2004.11 In that study, the authors observe 
that any analysis of this type is difficult because it does not 
include some of the hard-to-measure benefits of the program, 
such as the diversification of the government’s debt portfolio, 
and it only applies in retrospect. In other words, if actual 
inflation turns out to be higher than expected, the inflation-
linked program could instead appear costly.
Over the long run, however, inflation surprises should not 
matter. This is because investors are likely to learn from their 
mistakes and not repeat their forecast errors indefinitely. 
If investors incorporate all known information into their 
predictions, inflation surprises should be unbiased, with as 
many downward surprises in inflation performance as upward 
surprises. 
When considering the performance of TIPS over the 
expected life of the program, we believe this longer term 
perspective is most relevant. If an experiment were to be run 
thousands of times drawing from the underlying distribution 
of possible inflation outcomes, would the Treasury’s costs have 
been lower, on average, with TIPS or with nominal Treasuries? 
10 United Kingdom Debt Management Office (2001, p. 39).
11 Coeuré and Sagnes (2005).
Alternatively, we can ask whether the Treasury obtained the 
financing it needed at a low cost on an ex ante basis—that is, 
independent of inflation forecast errors. 
To answer this question, we apply a concept that TIPS 
analysts call the break-even inflation rate. Essentially, this is a 
value that makes the marginal investor indifferent between 
buying TIPS or nominal securities. It includes investors’ 
expectations about the amount of inflation they will be 
compensated for as well as any premium they are willing to pay 
for protection against inflation. It also includes the component 
of the TIPS yield that investors require as compensation for any 
deficiency in TIPS market liquidity relative to market liquidity 
for nominal Treasury securities. 
We conduct an ex ante analysis by comparing the auction 
break-even rate with a measure of inflation expectations.12 
Ideally, we would like to use a measure of inflation expected by 
TIPS investors at the time of the auction. Unfortunately, such 
a measure is not available. Instead, as an approximation, we use 
real-time estimates of expected inflation from the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF), conducted by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.13 Although the survey’s median 
estimate of the CPI inflation rate over the next ten years 
is available only quarterly,14 it is unlikely that inflation 
expectations are very volatile at a high frequency, leading us to 
expect that the SPF measure may be a reasonable gauge of 
market expectations.15 
Chart 1 compares the auction break-even rate at the ten-
year maturity point with the SPF long-run estimate of CPI 
inflation. It shows that during the early years of the TIPS 
12 We apply the same methodology as Roush (2008) to calculate the auction 
break-even rate. In particular, we estimate the break-even rate received at 
auction to be the implied inflation rate that equates the price of the TIPS at 
auction to a hypothetical on-the-run nominal security with the same real 
payment stream as the TIPS issue. For further details on the calculation, 
see Roush (2008).
13 The SPF is conducted on a quarterly basis. Survey respondents are 
professional economic forecasters in business and on Wall Street. 
14 We use the median ten-year-ahead CPI inflation forecast, which represents 
the median expectations of respondents for the average annual headline CPI 
inflation rate over the next ten years. As such, this forecast is for a similar 
inflation index and an almost similar time period as a newly issued ten-year 
TIPS. The SPF forecast is based on the seasonally adjusted headline CPI; if it 
were based on a non–seasonally-adjusted CPI, there should be no difference 
between the two because they would be forecasts of average annual rates, and 
therefore assumptions about seasonality over the year would be irrelevant. 
The time period of the survey is slightly off, given that TIPS are linked to 
non–seasonally-adjusted CPI lagged by approximately 2.5 months.
15 Although there are no direct measures of inflation expectations, we believe 
that the Survey of Professional Forecasters is a good proxy. An alternative 
survey is the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers, which is a median 
long-term (five-year) inflation expectations measure. The Michigan measure is 
based on the forecasts of consumers, as opposed to professional economists. 
A similar analysis using this measure shows a comparable pattern, where the 
early years of the TIPS program appear more costly.
A problem with current ex post analysis . . . 
is that it depends upon the performance 
of inflation over a relatively short period of 
time. If inflation proves to be meaningfully 
different than what was expected at the 
time of TIPS issuance, then this difference—
the “inflation surprise”—affects the costs 
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Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Chart 1
Ten-Year TIPS Auction Break-Even Minus SPF 
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program, the auction break-even inflation rate was lower than 
median inflation expectations of professional forecasters. This 
indicates that the ex ante cost of ten-year TIPS issuances was 
higher than the cost of nominal ten-year Treasury issuances. 
As of June 2008, however, the break-even inflation rate at 
the ten-year maturity point was about 2.50 percent, which is 
equal to the most recent SPF long-run estimate of 2.50 percent 
CPI inflation. If we assume that the SPF fairly represents the 
expectations of investors, then the current constellation of data 
indicates that on an ex ante basis, it appears that the cost of 
issuing TIPS is currently about equal to the cost of issuing 
nominal Treasuries.16 From this perspective, there appears to 
be little net benefit or cost from TIPS in terms of expected 
financing expenses. 
The break-even inflation rate obtained from a comparison 
of TIPS yields and nominal Treasury yields includes two other 
key elements beyond expectations about the future inflation 
rate: the inflation risk premium that investors pay for inflation 
protection and the illiquidity premium associated with TIPS 
compared with nominal Treasuries. If the insurance value of 
inflation protection exceeds the illiquidity premium, then the 
break-even rate will be greater than expected inflation and the 
ex ante cost of TIPS will be lower than it is for nominal 
Treasuries. If, however, the illiquidity premium is greater than 
16 Although the sample size is limited, the median ten-year-ahead CPI inflation 
rate forecasted by the SPF has typically overpredicted actual ten-year CPI 
inflation for the forecasts made between 1979 and 1997. If, in a longer sample 
period, the SPF proves to always overpredict ten-year-ahead CPI inflation, then 
the ex ante cost estimates in our analysis may be overstated. That said, we 
believe that over a longer sample period, the forecast errors of the SPF should 
net out to zero.
the inflation risk premium, then the break-even rate will be 
below the expected rate of inflation and the ex ante cost of TIPS 
issuance will be greater. The fact that break-even rates were 
below expected inflation during the first several years of the 
program indicates that the illiquidity premium must have been 
a dominant influence on ex ante costs over this period.17 More 
recently, however, break-even rates and inflation expectations 
appear to be approximately equal, implying that the two factors 
more or less cancel each other out. This shift could be 
attributable to a decline in the illiquidity premium in TIPS 
yields and/or an increase in the inflation risk premium. 
3. TIPS Illiquidity Premiums 
and Inflation Risk Premiums 
There is no direct evidence on the illiquidity premiums in TIPS 
yields and on inflation risk premiums, so we rely on indirect 
evidence and model-based estimates. In this section, we 
consider several approaches to modeling both types of 
premiums as well as review observable evidence on changes 
in TIPS market liquidity. 
3.1 Illiquidity Premiums
Over the past decade, TIPS issuance has grown nearly five times 
as quickly as nominal issuance, to where it now represents 
almost 10 percent of the Treasury’s marketable debt 
portfolio.18 During this period, the TIPS investor base appears 
to have widened and, according to Federal Reserve 2004 data—
information on market activity collected by the Federal Reserve 
17 Roush (2008) finds that the illiquidity premium in TIPS accounts for most 
of the ex post cost of TIPS during this period. 
18 This estimate does not account for the current principal inflation accretion 
on TIPS issues. If that amount is included, the share increases to 11.9 percent 
(U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of the Public Debt, Monthly Statement of 
the Public Debt of the United States, January 2008).
Over the past decade, TIPS issuance has 
grown nearly five times as quickly as 
nominal issuance, to where it now 
represents almost 10 percent of the 
Treasury’s marketable debt portfolio.6T h e  C a s e  f o r  T I P S
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FR 2004 
reporting forms.
Note: Figures reflect interdealers and customers; interdealer volumes 
represent one side of a trade.
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Sources: Investment Company Institute; U.S. Treasury Department.
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from primary dealers in U.S. government securities—trading 
volume among primary dealers in the secondary market has 
increased ten-fold (Chart 2).19 
While data on the distribution of TIPS holders are not 
available, there are some signs that TIPS market participation 
has increased and that the market has become less concen-
trated. For example, in our conversations with TIPS investors 
about TIPS market liquidity, they noted the ability to execute 
trades with a larger number of primary dealers compared with 
five to ten years earlier. Similarly, a review of the Federal 
Reserve 2004 data reveals that primary dealer trading in TIPS 
has become somewhat less concentrated across institutions.20 
For example, the top quintile (by volume) of primary dealers 
was responsible for an average of 68 percent of total TIPS 
volume in 2007, 10 percentage points lower than the 2001 
average.21, 22 In addition, there has been a notable increase in 
the size of mutual funds that hold inflation-indexed securities. 
According to the Investment Company Institute, assets under 
management in inflation-protected mutual funds have grown 
712 percent over the past five years (Chart 3). 
19 The increase in average daily trading volumes exceeds the increase in TIPS 
outstanding over the same period. Over the past ten years, the inflation-
adjusted par amount of TIPS outstanding has increased almost six-fold. 
20 The TIPS traders and the representatives of one electronic brokerage firm 
with whom we spoke observed that a large majority of trading in TIPS occurs 
through the primary dealer community.
21 By comparison, the nominal total transaction volume among the top 
quintile of primary dealers averaged 44 percent and 49 percent in 2007 and 
2001, respectively.
TIPS traders and investors have reported increased 
confidence in the longevity of the program and the ability to 
execute transactions in the secondary market over the past ten 
years.23 Of note, volume in TIPS was sufficient to support the 
expansion of electronic trading platforms—such as BrokerTec, 
Bloomberg, and TradeWeb—to enable TIPS electronic trading 
in 2003, 2001, and 2003, respectively. Furthermore, a review of 
bid-ask spreads reveals that TIPS liquidity appears to have 
improved somewhat in longer term markets since 2003, and is 
roughly the same in the five- and ten-year sectors. For example, 
according to Fleming and Krishnan (2008),24 when there were 
bid and ask quotes in the interdealer broker market, bid-ask 
spreads averaged approximately 2/32s, 3/32s, and 7/32s in the 
five-, ten-, and twenty-year benchmark issues, respectively,
22 According to Federal Reserve 2004 data on primary dealers, the breakdown 
of total TIPS transaction volume between the interdealer market and the 
dealer-to-customer market has also changed since 2001. Trading between 
primary dealers and customers accounted for 78.4 percent of total primary 
dealer transaction volume in 2001. In 2007, this percentage declined to 
73.4 percent, while interdealer trading increased. 
23 Most notably, TIPS market participants cited the Treasury’s 2002 public 
affirmation of its commitment to the program (<http://treas.gov/press/
releases/po3149.htm>), which it has reaffirmed in public statements as recently 
as the August 2008 refunding (<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
hp1095.htm>). 
24 Fleming and Krishnan note that a drawback of using the bid-ask spread to 
analyze TIPS market liquidity is that there is not always a two-sided market. For 
example, they estimate that between March 2005 and March 2008, there was a 
two-sided market in the on-the-run ten-year TIPS approximately 60 percent of 
the time in the interdealer broker market. As such, information on the extent 
to which there is a two-sided market complements the bid-ask spread when 
analyzing liquidity. Unfortunately, a longer time series of these data is not 
available.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2009 7
Chart 4
Illiquidity Premium in Ten-Year TIPS Yield
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between March 2005 and March 2008.25 Although figures are 
not directly comparable given the different data sources, Sack 
and Elsasser (2004) estimate bid-ask spreads of 2/32s for TIPS 
maturing between five and ten years and between 4/32s and 
16/32s for TIPS maturities beyond ten years in 2003. Our 
discussions with TIPS market participants also suggest that 
secondary-market liquidity has improved over the past five 
years. 
Even if TIPS liquidity has improved, it undoubtedly remains 
below that of on-the-run nominal securities. Daily trading 
volumes in on-the-run nominal securities far exceed those 
described for TIPS (Fleming and Mizrach 2008). The 
important question concerning future issuances is not whether 
TIPS liquidity has improved, but whether TIPS liquidity has 
25 Bid-ask spreads are measured in 1/32s of a point, where a point roughly 
equals 1 percent of the security’s par value.
improved enough to shrink the illiquidity premium sufficiently 
to make TIPS issuance cost-effective from the perspective of the 
Treasury. More precisely, are investors currently demanding 
substantial compensation in order to hold TIPS relative to a 
more liquid security? The larger such premiums are going 
forward, the greater the costs to the Treasury of future 
issuances, all else equal.
D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008) estimate the illiquidity 
premium in TIPS yields compared with off-the-run nominal 
securities from a no-arbitrage latent-factor model of the real 
and nominal term structure. The authors derive this measure 
by comparing observed TIPS yields with predictions based on 
an affine model of nominal term structure and an estimated 
process for inflation.26 
D’Amico, Kim, and Wei estimate that the liquidity 
premium in the ten-year TIPS yield was as large as 200 basis 
points in the early years of the program (Chart 4). Since then, 
however, the premium has trended down, and within the last 
six months has fluctuated below 50 basis points. The fact that 
the premium is positive for most of the sample indicates that 
TIPS have remained illiquid relative to off-the-run nominal 
securities, and thus even more so compared with their on-the-
run counterparts. Nonetheless, the fact that the premium 
investors demand in compensation for this illiquidity has 
shrunk to lower levels in recent years suggests that TIPS market 
liquidity has improved enough to have a dramatic effect on the 
cost-effectiveness of TIPS issuance. Indeed, as we discuss 
26 See the appendix for more details on the D’Amico, Kim, and Wei model. 
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below, it now compares favorably with estimates of the size of 
the inflation risk premium. 
Sack (2007b) provides an alternative measure of the 
illiquidity premium in five-year-forward TIPS yields beginning 
in five years. His measure is derived from a regression of TIPS 
yields on a variety of macroeconomic variables as well as the 
secondary-market turnover in TIPS.27 Consistent with 
D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008), Sack finds that the TIPS yields 
in the early years of the program were above the level predicted 
by macroeconomic fundamentals alone, and interprets the part 
of the TIPS yield that is predicted by TIPS turnover as a proxy 
for the illiquidity premium. This measure, shown in Chart 5, 
also points to a notable improvement in TIPS liquidity during 
the 2001-04 period. Of note, the level of Sack’s illiquidity 
measure is different from the D’Amico, Kim, and Wei estimate 
because Sack measures the illiquidity premium indirectly 
through a multifactor regression.
3.2 Inflation Risk Premiums
The notable declines in estimates of the illiquidity premiums 
in TIPS yields in recent years suggest that it now costs the 
27 In his regression, Sack includes a measure of the difference between 
the unemployment rate and the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment, expected real GDP over the subsequent year, the spread 
between West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures and spot prices, lagged WTI 
oil price inflation, the three-month moving average of correlation between 
daily changes in the stock market and break-even rates, and the squared 
difference between TIPS volume at each point in the sample with the end 
period volume.
Treasury relatively less to issue TIPS than nominal securities. 
This raises an important question about the size of the 
illiquidity premiums vis-à-vis the size of the inflation risk 
premiums. 
To better estimate the size of the inflation risk premiums, we 
consider several models. A simple measure of the inflation risk 
premium can be calculated based on the term structure of 
forward inflation compensation rates at distant horizons, as 
described in Sack (2007a). The rationale is that most factors 
affecting movements in inflation tend to die out after a few 
years, so that investors are unlikely to expect inflation to be 
different at adjacent forward rates, for example, at nine and ten 
years ahead.28 Thus, the spread between one-year-forward 
inflation ending in nine and in ten years is likely to be driven 
mostly by inflation risk premiums.29
Chart 6 presents a time series of the inflation risk premium 
from nine to ten years ahead measured according to this 
approach.30 The estimates in the chart are based on smoothed 
zero-coupon yield curves for real and nominal bonds 
(Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright 2006, 2008). The inflation risk 
premium has varied between 0 and 25 basis points since 1999, 
with an average value of 11 basis points. 
Another method for estimating the inflation term premium 
embedded in nominal Treasury yields is the no-arbitrage 
model used by D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008). Chart 7 
presents a time series of the inflation risk premium for ten-year 
zero-coupon inflation compensation from their model. This 
measure of the inflation risk premium varies between 40 and 
120 basis points over the history of the TIPS program. The 
levels of the two measures of inflation risk premiums are not 
directly comparable because one is a short-term far forward 
rate and one is long-term spot rate. However, it is useful to note 
that the correlation between the two measures is positive and 
28 This simplifying assumption ignores factors that affect the level of long-run 
inflation expectations. However, these factors are likely to occur infrequently. 
29 Although this approach does not explicitly account for liquidity effects, the 
fact that the illiquidity premium at nine years is unlikely to be very different 
from the premium at ten years signifies that, in essence, liquidity effects are 
more or less excluded by taking the spread at these adjacent horizons. 
30 We use a smoothed spline to abstract from small deviations in yields based 
on liquidity. Furthermore, we believe that any differences between our 
estimates, which are derived from a smoothed spline, and those derived from 
a bid, ask, or mid-spline would be small.
The notable declines in estimates of the 
illiquidity premiums in TIPS yields in 
recent years suggest that it now costs 
the Treasury relatively less to issue TIPS 
than nominal securities. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2009 9
Chart 6
Inflation Risk Premium at Ten Years from Term Structure of Forward Inflation Compensation
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statistically significant, albeit at only 0.28. More importantly, 
although the D’Amico, Kim, and Wei measure exhibits 
somewhat different variation, particularly in the first half of the 
sample, both series generally declined between 2004 and 2008, 
before picking up recently. This provides further evidence that 
the recent improvement in the cost of TIPS issuance was 
associated with a decline in TIPS illiquidity premiums rather 
than an increase in inflation risk premiums.
3.3 The Inflation Risk Premium Earned 
by the Treasury at Auction 
We conclude this section by explicitly decomposing our ex ante 
cost analysis into the components associated with illiquidity in 
TIPS and inflation risk premiums. We again compare the 
break-even rate of inflation with a measure of expected 
inflation from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. However, 10 The Case for TIPS
Chart 8
Inflation Risk Premiums at Historical TIPS Auctions
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we now exclude the illiquidity premium in TIPS yields 
estimated in D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008) before computing 
the break-even rate.31 A comparison of this break-even rate 
with inflation expectations yields an estimate of the premium 
investors were willing to pay for inflation protection at 
previous TIPS auctions. 
Chart 8 uses this method to present estimates of the 
inflation risk premium on TIPS auction days.32 The average 
risk premium over the sample is within the range of the other 
estimates, at 47 basis points. Furthermore, this measure of 
auction inflation risk premiums appears to have decreased over 
time. This may indicate that the initial purchasers of inflation-
indexed bonds were also those investors who put the highest 
value on inflation protection.33 An alternative explanation is 
that as inflation has stayed low, inflation expectations have 
31 D’Amico, Kim, and Wei calculate the liquidity component for five- and ten-
year TIPS yields, which we use to adjust the auction prices of five- and ten-year 
TIPS issues. For twenty- and thirty-year TIPS issues, we assume that the 
liquidity component is equal to the component for a ten-year security, which 
in the event that these securities are less liquid than the ten-year note, 
understates this effect and thus underestimates the risk premium at this 
horizon. D’Amico, Kim, and Wei also do not calculate liquidity yield 
components before 1999, because there were too few TIPS issues to construct 
a zero-coupon yield curve. For auctions occurring between 1997 and 1999, 
we assume that the liquidity yield component is equal to its value at the start 
of 1999. 
32 Note that the maturity of TIPS changes at each auction in the chart, 
complicating comparison with the time series of the inflation risk premiums. 
Put another way, the inflation risk premiums presented in the chart are not for 
a constant time horizon, but vary between five, ten, twenty, and thirty years, 
depending on the maturity of the TIPS being auctioned on a given date.
become better anchored. As this has occurred, the inflation risk 
premium that investors have been willing to pay for inflation 
protection has diminished somewhat over time.34 
Table 2 presents the average inflation risk premium by 
maturity of the securities auctioned. Although the size of the 
premium does not appear to increase consistently with 
maturity, this result may be misleading as it is attributable, at 
least in part, to changing issuance patterns. For example, with 
the exception of the July 2002 TIPS, five-year TIPS have only 
been issued during the past three years—a period in which oil 
prices increased more than 175 percent. This could contribute 
to the high estimate of the inflation risk premium for five-year 
TIPS. In contrast to the relatively limited issuance of five-, 
33 The fact that the inflation risk premiums by this measure are sometimes 
negative suggests possible measurement error in the estimation of inflation 
expectations. Furthermore, except for the two recent negative estimates of 
inflation risk premiums, the other negative estimates are not significantly 
different from zero.
34 The -32.3 basis point estimate of the inflation risk premium at the April 2008 
five-year TIPS auction may reflect market conditions at the time of the auction 
as opposed to the actual value investors placed on inflation protection. In 
particular, the historically low level of five-year TIPS yields (and the low 
expected coupon rate) reportedly may have deterred some investors from 
participating in the auction. Of note, the pre–auction-day yield of the five-year 
TIPS, at 0.53 percent, was the lowest pre–auction-day level compared with 
prior five-year TIPS auctions and was notably below the 1.79 percent average 
five-year TIPS yield since the Treasury brought back the five-year maturity 
point in 2004. In addition, part of the negative inflation risk premium may also 
reflect the flight-to-quality bid in the nominal market at the time. When we 
calculate the inflation risk premium that assumes that TIPS are as liquid as an 
on-the-run security (instead of an off-the-run security), the premium increases 
to -10.3 basis points.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2009 11
twenty-, and thirty-year TIPS, ten-year TIPS were issued 
throughout the sample and thus may provide the best overall 
estimate that is also maturity-constant. According to this 
estimate, a typical risk premium over this period has been 
about 40 basis points. 
The fact that investors appear willing to pay about 40 basis 
points for inflation protection indicates that the TIPS program 
does satisfy a real demand that is not met by nominal 
Treasuries. It also suggests a potential for significant gains to 
the Treasury from enhanced secondary-market trading 
liquidity. For example, if the TIPS market were as liquid as the 
market for off-the-run Treasuries, the Treasury would have 
realized a total cost savings from the TIPS program of 
$22 billion to $32 billion.35, 36 
35 We estimate the ex ante cost of the TIPS program as the present discounted 
value of the difference in the payment stream paid by the Treasury to TIPS 
holders from the expected payment embedded in TIPS prices, assuming that 
actual inflation equals the SPF measure of expected inflation and that no 
illiquidity premium exists.
36 Similarly, if the TIPS market were as liquid as the market for on-the-run 
Treasuries, the Treasury would have realized a total cost savings from the TIPS 
program of $28 billion to $37 billion.
4. Other Benefits of Inflation-
Indexed Debt
The Treasury’s ability to issue TIPS at lower inflation-adjusted 
yields because of a significant inflation risk premium is one of 
several benefits that inflation-linked debt issuance provides to 
investors and monetary policymakers. Other benefits of the 
TIPS program, although difficult to quantify, are potentially 
considerable. We now discuss how some of these benefits may 
make TIPS issuance more favorable to the Treasury and U.S. 
taxpayers than additional issuances of nominal securities. 
4.1 Inflation Hedge for Households
Economist James Tobin made one of the most convincing 
arguments in favor of inflation-indexed debt on behalf of 
households with real saving objectives: 
“… markets do not provide, at any price, a riskless way of 
accumulating purchasing power for the future, whether 
for old age, or for college education or for heirs…. 
Meanwhile we force savers to take risk, even if they would 
gladly pay for the privilege of avoiding it…. No private 
institution can fill this gap. No insurance company or 
pension fund could assume the risk of offering purchasing 
power escalation to its creditors without similarly 
(inflation) escalated securities in which to invest at least 
some of their funds.”37, 38
The key point of this argument is that even if nominal bond 
yields are high enough on average to compensate investors for 
the expected rate of inflation, an individual investor at any time 
may be overcompensated or undercompensated vis-à-vis the 
realized rate of inflation. By providing individuals with a way to 
insure against inflation risk, TIPS embed less risk than any 
other asset class. With virtually no credit risk or inflation risk, 
TIPS are one of the safest investments.39 Equities or other assets 
with uncertain nominal returns provide only an imperfect 
hedge depending on their correlation vis-à-vis inflation 
(Chu, Lee, and Pittman 1995).
37 Tobin (1963, pp. 204, 206).
38 While investors could purchase short-term debt and renegotiate the interest 
rate every three months, they would be exposed to roll-over risk.
39 There is some inflation basis risk in that TIPS are based on the non–
seasonally-adjusted consumer price index, and a household’s expenditure 
basket might differ from the basket in the CPI. Also, pension and endowment 
liabilities may be more closely related to other inflation or wage measures than 
the CPI. 
Table 2
Estimate of Inflation Risk Premium by Maturity 
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program does satisfy a real demand 
that is not met by nominal Treasuries. 
It also suggests a potential for significant 
gains to the Treasury from enhanced 
secondary-market trading liquidity.12 The Case for TIPS
This benefit has implications for individual investors as well 
as for the broader economy.40 By enabling investors to insure 
against inflation risk, the government allows them to choose 
the amount of inflation risk they hold, resulting in a more 
optimal allocation of risk among investors with different 
tolerances (Campbell and Shiller 1996). In addition, as Tobin 
(1963) argues, the existence of a risk-free inflation hedge may 
in turn encourage saving behavior by households. 
4.2 Improved Monetary Policy
The existence of TIPS helps to improve the conduct of 
monetary policy in a number of ways. Foremost, the program 
provides up-to-date information about the evolution of 
inflation expectations and real ex ante interest rates,41 which 
are important inputs to monetary policy decisions. Because 
increases in inflation expectations are often difficult to predict 
and to reverse, up-to-date information from TIPS about 
expectations may be important in helping monetary policy-
makers keep inflation expectations in check. This is critical 
because inflation expectations are a major element influencing 
the inflation process.42 In this role, TIPS are particularly useful 
because survey measures of inflation expectations, such as 
those from the University of Michigan and the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters, are available only with a lag and are 
updated much less frequently. Although inflation swaps 
40 It should be noted that there are potential income distribution effects if TIPS 
are more expensive to issue than nominal securities and TIPS holders are not 
evenly distributed across income groups. We do not address these effects here, 
however. 
41 Raw inflation compensation rates are not pure measures of inflation 
expectations because they contain inflation risk premiums and, potentially, 
distortions attributable to illiquidity. However, estimates of expected inflation 
can be derived using measures of these later components, as demonstrated by 
D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008). Furthermore, significant changes in TIPS 
liquidity tend to be slow compared with inflation expectations; as a result, over 
short periods of time, changes in inflation compensation rates can reflect a 
change in inflation expectations and/or inflation risk premiums.
provide an alternative market source of daily information on 
inflation expectations, these securities are much less liquid than 
TIPS (Beechey and Femia 2007).43 Moreover, it is unclear 
whether the U.S. inflation swaps market would exist without 
the TIPS market because TIPS provide a benchmark security 
that can be used to hedge the inflation payments on swaps. 
TIPS are also valuable in helping economists and 
policymakers understand the forces that influence inflation 
expectations. For example, minute-by-minute data on 
inflation compensation from financial markets provide a gauge 
of the effects of monetary policy actions and macroeconomic 
data releases on inflation expectations. In this way, TIPS help 
inform macroeconomic models that are important in the 
policymaking process. 
4.3 Improved Fiscal Policy
TIPS may also offer incentives for improved fiscal policy. They 
provide an explicit incentive for the fiscal (as well as monetary) 
authorities to conduct policy with an eye toward the conse-
quences for inflation. Recognition by the public that the 
government is accountable for higher inflation in the form of 
higher inflation payments to TIPS holders may help hold down 
inflation expectations and cause inflation expectations to be 
more firmly anchored, that is, less responsive to inflation shocks.
Moreover, TIPS can help improve the management of the 
national debt. Because payments on TIPS are tied to realized 
inflation, the receipts and expenditures of the Treasury 
42 If long-run inflation expectations become less anchored, shocks to inflation 
may result in a larger effect on inflation expectations and trend inflation. 
Consistent with this idea, Mishkin (2007) notes that “because long-run 
inflation expectations are a key driver of trend inflation, monetary authorities 
monitor long-run inflation expectations closely. If they find that they are losing 
credibility with the markets, so that inflation expectations begin to drift and 
rise above (or fall below) a desired level, they will take actions to restore their 
credibility.”
43 Trading in CPI futures, which provides another financial market read on 
inflation expectations, was introduced on the Chicago Board of Exchange in 
March 2004; however, market liquidity had declined to nearly zero by the 
summer of 2005. 
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Department are (all else equal) likely to be better matched—
since tax receipts are also nominal and likely to rise and fall 
with shifts in the underlying inflation rate. Thus, TIPS issuance 
may help reduce the overall volatility of the Treasury’s 
financing needs.44 A reduction in volatility helps promote the 
regularity and predictability of the issuance calendar, which 
increases the liquidity of outstanding Treasury securities and 
helps to foster demand at Treasury auctions. 
In addition, as noted by Timothy S. Bitsberger, Treasury 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance, TIPS may give 
the Treasury access to a broader investor base,45 which may 
reduce the Treasury’s overall funding costs. Bitsberger further 
observes that “by diversifying our [the Treasury’s] borrowing, 
we reduce exposure to a single adverse shock and both lower 
and smooth our borrowing costs.” The comparison between 
the prevailing interest rates on TIPS and on nominal Treasuries 
provides insight into the relative costs associated with issuing 
the last dollar of debt. However, just as important is the answer 
to the question whether TIPS issuance, by displacing nominal 
Treasury issuance, reduces the level of interest rates that the 
Treasury pays on its nominal issuances. In principle, a 
substantial shift in the composition of Treasury issuance into 
TIPS from nominal Treasuries could lead to lower interest rates 
paid on the remaining nominal Treasury issuance. This would 
occur if TIPS were not perfect substitutes for nominal Treasury 
securities and if the demand for nominal Treasuries was 
downward-sloping—that is, not completely elastic. 
The first condition almost certainly holds given the different 
attributes of TIPS and nominal Treasuries. If they were perfect 
44 Since payments on nominal Treasury debt are tied to expected inflation at 
the time of the security’s auction, differences in Treasury assets and liabilities 
can arise from divergences between realized and expected inflation. 
45 Presentation by Bitsberger to the Bond Market Association’s Inflation-
Linked Securities Conference, June 26, 2003 (<http://treas.gov/press/releases/
js505.htm>).
substitutes, there would not be a liquidity premium for 
nominal Treasuries relative to TIPS. The second condition 
seems likely to hold, as evidenced by a number of studies 
finding that an increase in the net amount of Treasury 
borrowing leads to higher expected borrowing costs for the 
Treasury.46 
While it is very difficult to estimate the effect that additional 
supply would have on Treasury yields, a few studies have 
touched upon the subject. Fleming (2002) suggests that a 
$1 billion increase in issuance size for the most recently issued 
three- or six-month bill raises its yield, relative to neighboring 
bill yields, by approximately 0.35 basis point. At the longer end, 
Krishnamurthy (2002) finds that a $1 billion increase in bond 
supply would raise the bond yield, relative to the yield on the 
previously issued bond, by 0.2 basis point. These results suggest 
that by issuing securities in a segmented TIPS market, the 
Treasury may keep realized yields on bill and nominal coupon 
securities lower than they otherwise would have been. 
5.C o n c l u s i o n
This article offers an in-depth evaluation of the Treasury 
Inflation-Protected Securities program. Our investigation 
reaches several important conclusions.
First, a decision on whether the continued issuance of TIPS 
is beneficial to U.S. taxpayers should be based on a comparison 
of the ex ante costs of TIPS and nominal Treasury issuance and, 
especially when these costs are negligible, on a consideration of 
the more difficult-to-measure benefits TIPS issuance provides 
taxpayers and policymakers. This decision should not be based 
on an ex post cost analysis because such analysis depends on 
the realized inflation rate over a relatively short history, which 
is irrelevant in assessing the expected costs of TIPS issuance 
compared with nominal Treasury issuance on a prospective 
basis.
Second, on an ex ante basis, the cost of TIPS issuance is 
about equal to or less than the cost of nominal Treasury 
issuance. The reason is that the value of inflation protection—
the implicit premium that investors are willing to pay in terms 
46 Tests of market segmentation of different types of Treasury debt have yielded 
mixed results (Fleming 2002; Krishnamurthy 2002; Laubach 2003). However, 
this work is generally limited to consideration of different maturities of 
nominal debt and does not consider segmentation of real versus nominal debt. 
That there might be more evidence for the latter is suggested by conventional 
wisdom that TIPS market participants tend to be buy-and-hold investors, 
including institutions such as pension funds. The Treasury auction allotment 
data consistently show that pension funds and investment funds have taken 
down an average of 30 percent of the amount issued at TIPS auctions since 
2000. In contrast, these investors have taken down only 10 percent of the 
amount offered at nominal coupon auctions over the same period. 
Because payments on TIPS are tied to 
realized inflation, the receipts and 
expenditures of the Treasury Department 
are (all else equal) likely to be better 
matched—since tax receipts are also 
nominal and likely to rise and fall with 
shifts in the underlying inflation rate. Thus, 
TIPS issuance may help reduce the overall 
volatility of the Treasury’s financing needs.14 The Case for TIPS
of lower TIPS yields—is now greater than or equal to the yield 
premiums investors demand for holding relatively illiquid 
TIPS compared with nominal Treasuries. 
Third, although the costs of TIPS issuance over the life of the 
program appear to have exceeded the costs of comparable 
nominal issuance, these costs were concentrated during the 
early years of the program, when the illiquidity premium 
associated with TIPS was large. That premium has shrunk 
significantly as the TIPS program has matured. Therefore, 
these early costs are “sunk” and should not be used to 
determine whether TIPS issuance is costly on an ongoing basis.
Fourth, TIPS issuance has other significant benefits that are 
not captured by an analysis of net issuance costs. These include 
the value to investors of having a risk-free asset that offers 
protection against inflation, the value to the monetary authority 
of having a real-time guide to shifts in inflation expectations, 
and the fact that a TIPS program likely displaces nominal debt 
issuance to some degree, allowing for a reduction in the average 
cost of nominal issuance as that supply is reduced. 
Finally, our analysis of the ex ante costs of the TIPS program 
and the more difficult-to-measure benefits suggests at least a 
modest net benefit to the Treasury. Because TIPS issuance 
appears to be attractive from the Treasury’s standpoint, a 
natural next step is answering the question, What is the optimal 
allocation of the Treasury’s liability portfolio between TIPS and 
nominal Treasury securities?FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2009 15
We briefly describe how D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008) 
estimate the illiquidity premium in yields on Treasury 
Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS). Their first step is to 
estimate yields on hypothetical real bonds that have the same 
liquidity as nominal Treasury securities, using a joint model of 
nominal yields and inflation. Intuitively, the authors are con-
structing these yields by considering the time-series properties 
of nominal Treasury yields and inflation, but they do so in a 
coherent asset pricing framework that rules out the possibility 
that investors are leaving arbitrage opportunities unexploited.
Modern asset pricing theory starts from the premise that the 
absence of arbitrage implies the existence of a pricing kernel,  , 
such that the price of any asset satisfies the relationship 
. Because bond prices are not complicated by 
uncertain cash flows, the price of an n-period nominal zero-
coupon bond is given just by  . This 
imposes tight restrictions on the relationship between the time-
series and cross-sectional properties of these bond prices. 
Following many researchers in the finance literature, D’Amico, 
Kim, and Wei assume that the pricing kernel,  , depends on 
the short-term interest rate,  , and prices of risk,  . If 
investors were risk-neutral, then   would be zero, but the 
authors make no such assumption. The short-term interest rate 
and prices of risk are assumed to be “affine” (linear plus a 
constant) functions of three unobserved factors, represented 
by , 
                                   
                                    .
In turn, these factors are assumed to follow a vector 
autoregression of the form
                         .
This implies that the yield on an n-period zero-coupon bond is 
given by an affine function of the factors
                                   ,
where   and   are functions of the parameters of the 
model including  ,  ,  ,  ,  , and  . Finally, a novel 
feature of the D’Amico, Kim, and Wei study is its assumption 
that expected inflation is also an affine function of the same 
factors, ,
                                      .
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Because it jointly models the nominal term structure and 
inflation, the model can be used to price a hypothetical real 
bond, the yield on which also turns out to be an affine function 
of the factors
                           .
The model is estimated using data on nominal Treasury 
yields, CPI inflation, and survey forecasts of nominal short-
term interest rates and inflation.47 The survey forecasts are 
treated as noisy measures of true expectations of future rates 
and inflation. In addition, substituting the parameter estimates 
into the last equation gives the estimated real yields.
Estimating the Illiquidity Premium 
in TIPS Yields
Because D’Amico, Kim, and Wei derive estimated real yields 
from the nominal off-the-run term structure rather than 
directly from TIPS themselves, the resulting estimated real 
yields implicitly embody the same liquidity characteristics as 
nominal off-the-run securities. Thus, by differencing these 
estimated real yields and observed TIPS yields, the authors 
obtain an estimate of the portion of observed real yields that 
owes to differences in nominal and real bond liquidity. A 
positive difference results when TIPS are less liquid than the 
nominal off-the-run securities, since in this case TIPS investors 
require a yield premium for holding the less liquid securities. 
Chart 4 in the text shows that this difference series is indeed 
positive throughout its history. It also exhibits a secular decline, 
which is consistent with improved liquidity as one would 
expect from a developing financial market. It also shows a small 
amount of variation around its downward trend. This may 
reflect high-frequency changes in the liquidity premium, but it 
is probably also importantly influenced by model fitting error, 
as the model-implied nominal yields are close—but not 
identical—to the actual observed yields. 
47 TIPS are not included directly in the version of the D’Amico, Kim, and Wei 
model discussed here because the sample of available TIPS is too short. Instead, 
the authors model inflation and use it to price synthetic real bonds. The 
authors also estimate a version of the model that incorporates TIPS; however, 
the shortness of the available TIPS sample means that their estimates are likely 
associated with greater estimation error. 
yn
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